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Summary
Most game-theoretic models of strategic interaction, indeed
most economic models of any sort, specify potential outcomes entirely
in terms of the preferences of the agents, as captured in their
(possibly cardinal) utility functions. The underlying assumption
is that the outcome of such interactions is determined entirely by
these preferences, together with the strategic possibilities available
to the agents . The purpose of this paper is to challenge the adequacy
of this assumption in general, by investigating it in the specific
context of two-person bargaining. In particular, we consider whether
certain experimental results reported earlier can be accounted for
strictly in terms of players' preferences and strategic possibilities,
and we report a new experimental study designed by answer this question.
The results strongly support the conclusion that sociological factors,
unrelated to what we normally consider to be the "economic" parameters
of a game, can decisively influence the outcome of bargaining, in a
systematic manner.
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specifying precisely how prices are determined. (Of course, this might
be of considerable importance; e.g. in markets having multiple competi-
tive equilibria).
As competition becomes less perfect, rational agents presumably
act less like price-takers, interaction among agents becomes less like
a collection of single-person decision problems, and the assumption
that the decision process can be completely modelled without other in-
formation than agent preferences becomes less tautological. That is,
in game situations, there is no a priori reason to believe that struc-
tural information about the game together with information about indi-
vidual player's preferences will be an adequate basis on which to con-
struct a model of rational interaction among the players. Nevertheless,
while there have been some attempts to consider the potential effect of
"sociological" information about the players (e.g. information concern-
ing the manner in which players choose among different potentially sta-
ble modes of behavior, such as different von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944)
solutions) , these attempts have all been carried out in the context of
models which are defined entirely in terms of the players' preferences
and strategic possibilities.
In what follows, we will demonstrate that, at least for the case of
two-person bargaining, models defined exclusively in terms of this sort of
information are inadequate as descriptive models. (We also argue that,
because of the interactive nature of bargaining, such models are conse-
quently unsatisfactory prescriptive models for rational agents). Our
argument will thus be directed not only at identifying shortcomings of
specific theories of bargaining which appear in the literature, but at
showing that any descriptive theory whose predictions are determined
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exclusively by the players' preferences and strategic possibilities must
share these shortcomings. In order to support such a strong conclusion,
data from a controlled experiment, conducted under laboratory conditions,
will be presented.
This paper consists of six sections. In section 2 we will consider
cooperative models of bargaining, and discuss how such models may be
tested experimentally. Section 3 will review the experiment of Roth
and Malouf (19 79), and discuss the manner in which it suggests that
these cooperative models fail. Section 4 introduces the class of non-
cooperative (strategic) models of bargaining, and discusses how such
models are not ruled out by the existing data. Section 5 reports a new
experiment, designed to determine whether the phenomena originally
reported by Roth and Malouf (1979) are in fact caused by strategic
considerations, and can therefore be modelled by structural information
about the game together with information about the players' preferences.
It is perhaps appropriate to mention at this point that, before conducting
this experiment, we expected that the data would be consistent with a
purely strategic theory of bargaining. However, the results clearly
indicate that non-strategic, 'sociological' factors play a decisive
2
role. This conclusion and its implications are discussed in section 6.
2. Cooperative Models of Bargaining
Cooperative games are customarily modelled by specifying the set
of feasible utility payoffs attainable by each non-empty subset of play-
ers for its members. Following Nash (1950), the two-player bargaining
games considered here are modelled by a pair (S,d), where d is a point
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in the plane, and S is a compact convex subset of the plane which con-
tains d and at least one point x such that x > d. The interpretation is
that S is the set of feasible expected utility payoffs to the players,
any one of which can be achieved if it is agreed to by both players.
If no such agreement is reached, then the disagreement point d is the
result.
Nash proposed that bargaining between rational players be modelled
by means of a function called a solution , which selects a feasible out-
come for every bargaining game. That is, if we denote the class of all
2
two-player bargaining games by B, a solution is a function f : B + R
such that f(S,d) is an element of S. Thus a solution is a model of bargaining
which depends only on the information about the underlying game which is
contained in the model (S ,d)
.
In order to insure that such a theory of bargaining would depend
only on the information about preferences contained in a player's util-
ity function, Nash further proposed that a solution should possess the
following property.
Property 1. Independence of equivalent utility representations:
A A
If (S,d) and (S,d) are bargaining games such that
S = { (a,x.. + b
1
,
a„x
2
+ b„)
|
(x.. ,x„) e S} and
d = (a,d
1
+ b
1 ,
a
2^2 + ^2^ w^ere a i » an b i an<^ N are
numbers such that a., and a„ > 0, then
f(S,d) = (a
1
f
1
(S,d) + b lf a2 f2 (S,d) +b 2 ).
In order to understand the significance of this property, we need
to consider the set of underlying alternatives over which the bargaining
is conducted. Suppose that two individuals are bargaining over some set
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of alternatives A, containing some pre-specified disagreement outcome
a*. Then if these individuals have utility functions u.. and u» over the
set A, the resulting bargaining game (S,d) is given by
(1) S = {(U;L (a),u2 (a))|a e A}, d = (u^a*) ,u2 (a*))
.
Recall that an individual i's utility function u. is a real-valued
function defined on the set of alternatives A. It is a model of his
choice behavior, in the sense that u. (a) > u. (b) for two alternatives a
and b if and only if he prefers a to b; i.e., if and only if he would
choose alternative a when faced with the choice between a and b. von
Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) demonstrated conditions on an individual's
preferences which are sufficient so that his choice behavior over risky
alternatives is the same as if he were maximizing the expected value of
his utility function. Such a utility function is uniquely defined only
up to an interval scale, which is to say that the origin (zero point)
and unit of the utility function are arbitrary. Thus if u. is an ex-
pected utility function representing individual i's preferences, then
another utility function v. represents the same preferences if and only
if v. = a.u. + b., where a. is a positive number.
So Property 1 states that if a game (S,d) is derived from (S,d) by
transforming the utility functions of the players to equivalent repre-
sentations of their preferences, then the same transformations applied
to the outcome of the game (S,d) should yield the outcome selected in
(S,d). That is, if (S,d) is given by
(1') S = Uv
1
(sL),v
2
(a))\a e A}, d = (v
1
(a*),v
2
(a*)),
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where v. = a.u. + b. for i = 1,2, and if a solution f yields
1 1 x i
f(S,d) = (u (b),u„(b)), then Property 1 requires that
f(S,d) = (v
1
(b) ,v„(b) ) , i.e. that the payoff predicted by the solution
f should correspond to the same alternative b in both games. Thus
Property 1 states that a solution should depend only on those properties
of the utility functions which represent the preferences of the players,
and not on the arbitrary features of the utility functions.
Nash (1950) also proposed three additional properties which, to-
gether with property 1, characterize a unique solution (which is often
referred to as Nash's solution). Other additional properties have sub-
sequently been used to characterize other specific solutions, and the
subject has inspired a considerable amount of research (see Roth (1979)
for a survey). However, we will be concerned here with the general class
of solutions which are defined on the class B of bargaining games, and
which possess property 1.
A theory of bargaining embodied in such a solution makes two dis-
tinct (but related) predictions. First, since the solution depends only
on the utility payoffs available to the players, it yields the same pre-
diction for a given game (S,d) no matter how that game arises; e.g.
whether the game arises from bargaining over a set of alternatives A by
individuals with utility functions u.. and u», or from bargaining over
an entirely different set of alternatives A' by individuals with appro-
priate utility functions. That is, such a solution predicts that bar-
gaining situations which have the same representation (S,d) in utility
space will result in the same utility payoffs to the players. Second,
if (S,d) is related to (S,d) as in the statement of Property 1, then
the solution predicts that the utility payoffs resulting from the two
games will be related as in Property 1, regardless of whether (S,d) dif-
fers from (S,d) only by a purely formal transformation (as in equations
(1) and (1')), or whether the two games have substantive differences,
as when they arise from bargaining over different sets of alternatives.
Thus, to the extent that appropriate games can be constructed, ex-
periments can be conducted to test the predictive value of solutions
which are defined on the class B, and which are independent of equiva-
lent utility representations. The next section briefly reviews such an
experiment, originally reported in Roth and Malouf (1979).
3. The experiment of Roth and Malouf
Since the class of theories considered in the previous section are
defined in terms of the players' utilities, experimental tests of such
theories must be constructed in a way which permits the players' utili-
ties to be determined. A novel feature of the experiment reported in
Roth and Malouf (1979) is that it employed games constructed in a way
which permits the utility of the players for each outcome to be deter-
mined directly. In order to explain how this was accomplished, it will
be helpful to recall precisely what information is contained in an ex-
pected utility function.
Consider the case in which the set A of alternatives contains ele-
ments a and c such that a is strictly preferred to c, and for any alter-
native b in A, the player likes a at least as well as b, and b at least
as well as c. Then if u is a utility function representing this indi-
vidual's preferences over the set of alternatives A, it must have the
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property that u(a) >_ u(b) _> u(c). Since u is defined only up to an in-
terval scale, we may arbitrarily choose its unit and zero point, and in
particular we nay take u(a) = 1 and u(c) = 0. The problem of determin-
ing u(b) then becomes the problem of finding the appropriate value be-
tween and 1 so that all those lotteries over alternatives that the
individual prefers to b have a higher expected utility, and all those
lotteries to which b is preferred have a lower expected utility. If we
denote by L(p) = [pa;(l-p)c] the lottery that with probability p yields
alternative a and with probability (1-p) yields alternative c, then the
utility of participating in the lottery L(p) is its expected utility,
pu(a) + (l-p)u(c) = p. If p is the probability such that the individual
is indifferent between b and L(p), then their utilities must be equal,
and so, u(b) = p. Thus when we say that the utility of alternative b
to a given individual is known, we mean that the probability p is known
such that the individual is indifferent between having alternative b
for certain or having the risky alternative L(p).
Binary Lottery Games
Since knowing an individual's expected utility for a given agree-
ment is equivalent to knowing what lottery he or she thinks is as de-
sirable as that agreement, then in a bargaining game in which the fea-
sible agreements are the appropriate kind of lotteries, knowing the
utilities of the players at a given agreement is equivalent to simply
knowing the lottery they have agreed on. In each game of this experi-
ment, therefore, players bargained over the probability that they would
receive a certain monetary prize, possibly a different prize for each
player.
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Specifically, they bargained over how to distribute "lottery tick-
ets" that would determine the probability that each player would win his
or her personal lottery (i.e., a player who received 40% of the lottery
tickets would have a 40% chance of winning his monetary prize and a 60%
chance of winning nothing) . In the event that no agreement was reached
in the allotted time, each player received nothing. In other words, a
player received his prize only if an agreement was reached on splitting
the lottery tickets and if he won the ensuing lottery. Otherwise he
received nothing. We will refer to games of this type, in which each
player has only two possible monetary payoffs, as binary lottery games .
To interpret the set of feasible outcomes of a binary lottery game
in terms of each player's utility function for money, recall that if we
consider each player's utility function to be normalized so that the
utility for receiving his prize is 1, and the utility for receiving
nothing is 0, then the player's utility for any lottery between these
two alternatives is the probability of winning the lottery. That is,
an agreement which gives a player p percent of the lottery tickets gives
him a utility of p.
Note that a change in the prizes is therefore equivalent to a
change in the scale of the player's utility functions. This makes it
possible to use binary lottery games to experimentally investigate the
circumstances under which the bargaining process can indeed he described
by a solution which is independent of equivalent utility representations.
Design of the Experiment
Each player played four games, in random order, against different
opponents. Each player played all four games under one of two
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infcreation conditions: full information , or partial information . In
the full information condition, each player was informed of the value
6
of his own potential prize and of his opponent s potential prize. In
the partial information condition, each player was informed only of the
value of his own prize.
Players were seated at isolated computer terminals, and were al-
lowed to communicate freely by teletype, but they were unaware of the
identity of their opponents. (The only limitations on free communica-
tion were that players were prevented from identifying themselves, or
from conveying information about the monetary value of their prizes in
the partial information condition.) The bargaining process consisted
of the exchange of messages and of (numerical) proposals, and terminated
in an agreement when a proposal was accepted or in disagreement if no
gproposal had been accepted after 12 minutes.
In game 1, no restriction was placed on the percentage of lottery
tickets which each player could receive, and both players had the same
prize of $1.00. Game 2 was played with the same prizes as game 1, but
one of the players (player 2) was restricted to receive no more than 60%
of the lottery tickets. Game 3 was played with the same rules as game
1, but with different prizes for the two players: $1.25 for player 1,
and $3.75 for player 2. Game 4 was played under the same rules as game
2, with the same prizes as game 3 (see Table 1).
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Table 1
Prizes and Feasible Distributions
for Games 1-4
Max-
imum £
Max-
imum %
Prize for Prize for allowed allowed
Game Player 1 Player 2 Player 1 Player 2
1
2
3
4
$1 $1 100 100
$1 $1 100 60
$1.25 $3.75 100 100
$1.25 $3.75 100 60
Note that game 1 is related to game 3, and game 2 is related to
game 4 by a change in the prizes, and hence by a scale change as in
Property 1. So if the bargaining process obeys Property 1, we should
observe the same outcomes in these pairs of games. And if the bargain-
ing process depends only on the set of feasible utility payoffs, then
we should observe the same outcome for each game under both information
conditions, since the set of feasible lotteries (and hence utilities)
faced by each player is unaffected by the information conditions.
Denote the difference between the probabilities p.. and p„ received
by the two players by D = p - p„. If (as Nash's solution, for instance,
predicts) we were to observe the players divide the lottery tickets
equally in these games, so that p = p„ = 50%, then we would have D =
in these games. On the other hand, if we were to observe the players
reach agreements which equalized their expected monetary payoffs, then
we would observe D = for games 1 and 2, and D = 50 for games 3 and 4
(corresponding to p.. = 75, p_ = 25).
In fact, the observed outcomes in the partial information condition
were extremely close to an equal division of the lottery tickets, while
the observed outcomes in the full information condition showed a pro-
nounced shift in the direction of equal expected monetary payoffs.
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(That is, in the full information condition, in the games in which the
two players had different prizes, the observed agreements tended to give
a higher probability of winning to the player with the smaller prize.)
The means and standard deviations of the observed values of D are sum-
marized in Table 2.
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations for D = p - P 2
Game
Statistic 12 3 4
M
SD
Full information (11 pairs)
0.00 1.91 34.60
0.00 12.17 19.28
21.64
22.48
M
SD
Partial information (8 pairs)
0.00 -1.32 -2.50
0.00 8.33 4.63
2.50
4.11
Statistical analysis confirms that, in the partial information con-
dition D is not significantly different between games 1 and 3, or be-
tween games 2 and 4, while in the full information condition these dif-
ferences are significant. Also, the outcomes for each of games 3 and 4
Q
are significantly different in the two information conditions.
The observed outcomes in the full information condition thus do not
conform to the predictions of property 1, and their difference from the
outcomes observed in the partial information condition cannot be ac-
counted for in terms of the set of feasible utility payoffs. That is,
the shift towards equal expected monetary payoffs observed in the full
information condition of this experiment and confirmed in subsequent ex-
periments (cf. Roth and Malouf (1980), Malouf (1980), Roth and Murnighan
(1980)) cannot be integrated with the results of the partial information
condition by a model which depends only on the set of feasible utility
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payoffs. In the next section, we will explore the possibility that the
observed differences between the two information conditions can be ac-
counted for by the fact that the set of feasible negotiation strategies
available to the players depends on the nature of the information which
they possess.
4. Strategic Use of Information
Models of the kind we have been considering, which define a game
in terms of its feasible utility payoffs, do not include a description
of the strategic choices which the players must make to achieve these
payoffs. In the experiment reported in the previous section, these
strategic choices involve the exchange of both proposals and messages.
Examination of the transcripts of the bargaining encounters in the
experiment reveal striking differences in the content of messages between
encounters in the two information conditions. While the exchange of mes-
sages was vigorous in both information conditions, only in the full infor-
mation condition could messages contain comparisons of the players' prizes,
Not too surprisingly, in the full information condition, players who had
smaller prizes than their opponents often persistently demanded more
than half of the lottery tickets. Since the results of the bargaining
in the full information condition were observed to satisfy this demand
while the results in the partial information condition did not, it is
certainly plausible to speculate that the difference between the two
conditions can be accounted for entirely in terms of the different kinds
of strategic choices available to the players in the two conditions. In
order to state this hypothesis precisely, we will need tc consider a
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general model of the game which incorporates information about the play-
ers' strategies as well as their preferences for the feasible outcomes.
Consider a strategic model of a binary lottery game involving players
with utility functions u
1
and u~ defined on some set A of alternatives
(lotteries) , one of which will be the outcome of the game. Players 1 and
2 have strategy sets S and S- , respectively, and associated with every
pair of strategy choices s = (s ,s ) is an outcome 0(s) = a contained in A.
That is, the outcome of the game is determined by the outcome function
from the set S
1
x S„ to A: i.e. the rules of the game are that each
player i chooses a strategy s. from his strategy set S., and the combined
choices of the players determine the outcome a in A, which results in the
utility payoff vector (u.. (a) ,u2 (a)) . We will refer to such a model as
the expanded strategic form of a game; i.e. a game G in expanded strategic
form consists of the elements G = (S.. ,S_ ,0,A,u
1
,u~) . We will adopt the
convention that, in a binary lottery game in expanded strategic form,
the utility functions are normalized so that each player's utility for
a lottery is equal to the probability it gives him of winning his prize.
(This means that when we compare different games whose sets of alterna-
tives involve lotteries over different prizes, we will be comparing
games defined in terms of different utility functions).
Modelled in this way, all information about the players' prefer-
ences is contained in the utility functions u- and u_ and the set A of
alternatives on which these preferences are defined, while the strategy
sets S
1
, S„ , and the outcome function contain the 'structural' infor-
mation about the game, which tells us how the players actions are trans-
lated into outcomes. That is, u..
,
u„ , and A model the players'
-15-
objectives, while the strategy sets S and S„ together with the outcome
function model the mechanism which the game provides for resolving
these (different) objectives. If we have a theory of games which pre-
dicts the outcome of a game in terms of the players' preferences and
the structure of the game mechanism, then two games which have the same
relationship between strategy choices, outcomes, and preferences will
yield the same prediction. Formally, we can express this as follows.
A S\ -*- A A A a
Let G = (S
1
,S
2
,0,A,u
1
,u
2
) and G = (S^S^O.A,^,^) be two games
a
in expanded strategic form. Then G and G are defined to be strategi-
cally equivalent if there exist transformations T.. and T„ such that,
a
for i = 1.2. T. : S. -*- S. is one-to-one and onto, and for every strategy
' ' i i l
A A A
pair s = (s s ) in S x S_ , u.(0(s)) = u
±
(0(s)) for i = 1,2, where
a
s = (T (s ),T„(s )) is the image of s under T = (T^T^). Thus the trans-
formations T and T„ can be regarded essentially as relabellings of the
A
strategy sets S.. and S_ , and the outcome function acts on the re-
A A
labelled strategy sets S.. and S„ in the same way that acts on S^ and
s
2
.
A model of the bargaining process which depends only on the pref-
erences of the players and the structure of their strategic possibili-
ties would be one which made the same predictions for any two strategi-
A
cally equivalent games G and G. For instance, if we let E denote the
set of all bargaining games in expanded strategic form, then a parallel
to a solution of the kind considered in section 2 would be a function
2
g:E * R . That is, a solution g for games in expanded strategic form
selects a feasible utility payoff g(G) for every bargaining game G in
the class E. Such a solution g depends only on the preferences of the
players and the structure of the game if it obeys the following property,
-16-
Property 2. Invariance with respect to strategic equivalence:
If G and G are strategically equivalent games, then
g(G) = g(G).
Note that, although for simplicity we are considering solutions g
which select a payoff corresponding to a unique outcome, the extension
of property 2 to the case of solution concepts which select sets of pay-
offs corresponding to more than one outcome is straightforward. For ex-
12
ample, the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs of the game is invari-
ant with respect to strategic equivalence since, if s = (s ,s_) is any
equilibrium strategy pair yielding the payoff vector (u (0(a)) ,u_ (0(a)))
in the game G, then s = (T (s),T„(s)) is an equilibrium strategy pair
yielding the same payoffs in a strategically equivalent game G. So, for
instance, a theory of games which merely specified that the outcome of
a game would be an equilibrium outcome would be invariant with respect
to strategic equivalence.
Of course , a theory of games which selects a unique equilibrium
payoff of each game, for instance, may or may not be invariant with re-
spect to strategic equivalence, depending on whether it depends only on
the structural information of the game, or on information about strate-
gies and outcomes which is not preserved in going from one game to a
13
strategically equivalent game. The experiment reported in the next
section is designed to determine whether the bargaining process observed
in the experiment of Roth and Malouf (1979) is invariant with respect to
strategic equivalence.
Since we are interested in bargaining situations which allow ex-
tensive communication between the participants, we will not attempt to
-17-
14
model their strategy sets explicitly. Instead, we will argue that
certain games are strategically equivalent by demonstrating the isomor-
phism between them. By observing strategically equivalent games, we
will seek to determine whether the differences observed between the full
and partial information conditions are due to the structural properties
of the game, or whether they are due to other factors.
5. A New Experiment
The experiment reported in this section involves binary lottery
games (cf. section 3) whose prizes are stated in terms of an interme-
diate commodity. Each bargainer was told that the prizes would be ex-
pressed in "chips" having monetary value, and each player played four
games under one of three information conditions: high information ,
intermediate information
,
or low information . In each of the three
conditions, each player knew the number of chips in his potential prize
and their monetary value, but the information each player was given
about his opponent's prize varied with the information condition. In
the high information condition, each player was informed of both the
number of chips in his opponent's potential prize and their monetary
value. In the intermediate information condition, each player was in-
formed of the number of chips in his opponent's potential prize, but not
of their monetary value. In the low information condition, neither
player was informed of either the number of chips in bis opponent's po-
tential prize, or of their value. In the latter two conditions, players
were prevented from communicating the missing information about the prizes
(see the detailed description of methods below).
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The four games (which were played in random order) are summarized
in Table 3. Note that the games are counterbalanced in the sense that,
in two of the games, the player with the higher number of chips also has
a higher value per chip (and hence a higher value prize) , while in the
other two games, the player with the higher number of chips has a lower
value per chip and a lower value prize.
Table 3
Games
Number
of
chips
Player 1
Value
per
chip
Value
of
prize
Number
of
chips
Player 2
Value
per
chip
Value
of
prize
Game 1 60 $0.05 $ 3.00 20 $0.45 $9.00
Game 2 80 $0.03 $ 2.40 240 $0.04 $9.60
Came 3 100 sS0.09 $ 9.00 300 $0.01 $3.00
Game 4 150 $0.08 $12.00 50 $0.06 $3.00
The experiment has been designed to take advantage of two kinds of
strategic equivalence relations. First, note that, binary lottery games
whose prizes are expressed in both chips and money, played in the low
information condition of this experiment, are strategically equivalent
to binary lottery games with the same monetary prizes whose prizes are
expressed in money alone, played in the partial information condition of
the previous experiments. This follows from the fact that, under the
rules of the low and partial information conditions, any message which
is legal for one kind of game would be a legal message for the other,
and so the strategy sets are the same for both kinds of games, as are
the utility functions and the underlying set of alternatives.
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Second, chip games played under the intermediate infor-
mation condition of this experiment are strategically equivalent to
money games played under the full information condition of the previ-
ous experiments, so long as the monetary values of the two prizes in
each money game are in the same proportion as the numbers of chips in
the prizes in the corresponding chip game. This follows from the fact
that any legal message in one kind of game can be transformed into a
legal message in the other kind of game by substituting references to
chips for references to money (or vice versa) in any message concerning
the value of the prizes. And since the relative value (in money or
chips) of the prizes is the same in corresponding games, the outcome
function preserves the necessary equivalence; eg. an agreement by the
players that they should receive equal expected values (in money or
chips) will yield the same probabilities (and hence the same utilities)
to the players in both kinds of games.
Having established these equivalence relations, we can now proceed
to formulate two distinct sets of predictions concerning the results of
this new experiment, depending on which of two competing hypotheses we
believe account for the experimental results summarized in section 3.
These hypotheses and the corresponding predictions can be stated as fol-
lows.
A. The strategic hypothesis
As discussed in section A, this hypothesis states that the shift
towards equal expected monetary payoffs in the full information condi-
tion as compared to the partial information condition, observed in the
-20-
previous experiments, is due to the different strategy sets available
to the players in the two conditions. Consequently, this hypothesis
predicts that a similar shift will be observed in the intermediat e in-
formation condition as compared to the low information condition of
this experiment, since the chip games played under these two conditions
in this experiment are strategically equivalent, respectively, to games
played under the full and partial information conditions of the previous
experiments. Specifically, the prediction is that games played in the
low information condition of this experiment will lead to agreements
in which the two players receive approximately equal probabilities of
winning their prizes, while games played in the intermediate information
condition will lead to agreements in which the player with the smaller
number of chips will receive a significantly higher probability of win-
ning his prize than will his opponent. Thus the prediction is that the
observed values of D will not deviate significantly from zero in any of
the games in the low information condition, while in the intermediate
information condition, D should decrease significantly in games 1 and
4, and increase significantly in games 2 and 3. (Notice that the
strategic hypothesis makes no prediction about the high information
condition of this experiment, since the games in this condition are
not strategically equivalent to any games played in the previous ex-
periments. However, if the strategic hypothesis is correct, the obser-
vations in this condition will illuminate the interaction between nego-
tiation strategies concerning chips and those concerning money because
of the way the games are counterbalanced)
.
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B. The sociological hypothesis
This hypothesis seeks to account for the phenomena reported in sec-
tion 3 in terms of social conventions which exist among the bargainers.
The underlying idea is that in conflict situations involving a wide
range of rational potential agreements, social conventions may serve to
make some arguments and demands more credible than others. Thus this
hypothesis views the low variance observed in the partial information
condition of the previous experiments as evidence that the agreement at
which both players have an equal chance of winning their prizes is sup-
ported by a social norm which inclines both players to believe that
their opponent may be unwilling to accept less. The shift towards equal
expected monetary payoffs which was observed in the full information
condition is viewed as evidence that when information about the monetary
value of the prizes is available, the agreement giving the players equal
expected payoffs is also supported by such a convention, and so the bar-
gaining focuses on resolving the difference between two credible posi-
16
tions.
By "social conventions," we mean customs or beliefs which are com-
monly shared by the members of a particular society. In order to be
commonly shared, such conventions must necessarily be concerned with
familiar quantities. By stating the prizes in terms of an unfamiliar
artificial commodity ("chips") which conveys no information about more
familiar quantities such as the value of a given prize or a player's
probability of winning it, this new experiment seeks to introduce a
quantity about which no social conventions apply. The sociological hy-
pothesis predicts, therefore, that information about the number of chips
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in each prize will not affect the bargaining. Specifically, this hy-
pothesis predicts that the low and high information conditions of this
experiment will replicate the partial and full information conditions of
the previous experiments, respectively, and that the intermediate informa-
tion condition will not differ significantly from the low information
condition. Thus the prediction is that D will not differ significantly
from zero in any of the games in the low or intermediate information con-
ditions, but that in the high information condition D will significantly
increase in games 1 and 2, and decrease in games 3 and 4.
The most pointed difference between the predictions of the two hy-
potheses is therefore in their predictions for the intermediate informa-
tion condition of the current experiment. The strategic hypothesis pre-
dicts that the intermediate information condition of this experiment
will resemble the full information condition of the previous experiments,
and exhibit a pronounced shift away from agreements at which the players
receive equal probabilities. The sociological hypothesis predicts in-
stead that the intermediate information condition will resemble the par-
tial information condition of the previous experiment, with the players
receiving equal probabilities.
Before reporting the results of this experiment, we describe below
the methods by which it was implemented. These methods are substan-
tially the same as those employed in the experiment of Roth and Malouf
(1979).
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Methods
Each participant was seated at a visually isolated terminal of a
computer-assisted instruction system developed at the University of
Illinois, called PLATO, whose features include advanced graphic displays
and interactive capability. The experiment was conducted in a room con-
taining over 70 terminals, most of which were occupied at any given time
by students uninvolved in this experiment. Participants were seated by
the experimenter in order of their arrival at scattered terminals
throughout the room, and for the remainder of the experiment they re-
ceived all of their instructions, and conducted all communication,
through the terminal.
The subjects were drawn from an introductory business administra-
tion course taken primarily by college juniors. Pretests were run with
the same subject pool to make sure that the instructions to participants
were clear and easily understandable.
Background information including a brief review of probability theory
was presented first. The main tools of the bargaining were then intro-
duced: these consisted of sending messages or sending proposals. A
proposal was a pair of numbers, the first of which was the sender's
probability of receiving his/her prize and the second was the receiver's
probability. The use of the computer enabled any asymmetry in the pre-
sentation to be avoided. PLATO also computed the expected number of
chips and the expected monetary value of each proposal and displayed the
proposal on a graph of the feasible region. After being made aware of
those computations, consistent with the information condition, the
bargainer was given the option of cancelling the proposal before its
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transmittal. Proposals were said to be binding on the sender, and an
agreement was reached whenever one of the bargainers returned a proposal
identical to the one he had just received.
Messages were not binding. Instead, they were used to transmit
any thoughts which the bargainers wanted to convey to each other. To
insure anonymity, the monitor intercepted any messages that revealed
the identity of the players. In the low information condition and
in the intermediate information condition, the monitor also intercepted
messages containing restricted information about the available prizes.
The intercepted message was returned to the sender with a heading indi-
cating the reason for such action.
To verify their understanding of the basic notions, the subjects
were given some drills followed by a simulated bargaining session with
the computer. As soon as all the participants finished this portion of
the experiments, they were paired at random and the bargaining started.
At the end of 10 minutes or when agreement was reached (whichever
came first), the subjects were informed of the results of that game and
were asked to wait until all the other bargainers were finished. For
the subsequent game there were new random pairings, and the bargaining
resumed. The cycle continued until all four games were completed. At
no point in the experiment were the players aware of what the other par-
ticipants were doing, or of the identity of their opponents.
The bargaining process consisted of the exchange of messages and
proposals, and participants were instructed that "your objective should
be to maximize your own earnings by taking advantage of the special
features of each session." Only if the bargainers reached agreement on
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what percentage of the "lottery tickets" each would receive were they
allowed the opportunity to participate in the lottery for the particular
game being played. All transactions were automatically recorded.
The lotteries were held after all four games were completed, and
each player was informed of the outcomes and the amount of his winnings.
A brief explanation of the purpose of the experiment was then given,
and the subjects were offered the opportunity to make comments, ask
questions etc. , and were directed to the monitor who paid them.
Results
Difference scores, D = p - p , were again the major dependent
variable in the analyses. The independent variables, the four games
and the three information conditions, were treated as between factors
I Q
in a 4 x 4 completely crossed analysis of variance. Two sets of
analyses were run, one including all bargaining outcomes (including
disagreements) , the other including only outcomes where an agreement
was reached. The findings for the two analyses were almost identical.
The analysis for only the agreements (disagreements excluded) revealed
a significant effect for games (F(3,114) = 14.36, p < .0001) and a sig-
nificant games by information interaction (F(6,114) = 12.92, p < .0001).
The means for the effects are shown in Table 4 and Figure 1: the un-
aggregated data are shown in Table 5. The main effect for games appears
to be a function of the high value of the prize for player 2 in games
1 and 2 (resulting in large negative scores for D in the full information
condition) and the high value of the prize for player 1 in games 3 and
4 (resulting in large positive scores for D in the fully information
condition). The interaction was analyzed further by assessing the simple
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main effects of information within each game. These results, also
shown in Table 4, indicate that the players' outcomes significantly
differed from one another (and from zero) in each of the four games.
Post hoc tests for these effects indicated that the high information
conditions differed significantly from the low and intermediate infor-
mation conditions in each game. No other differences were found.
Table 4
Mean Difference Scores (D) for the Games by Information
Interaction (and the Associated Simple Effects)
Game Low
Information
Intermediate High
Simple Effects
JF df p <
1
2
3
4
"• 71b
i.oo
b
.oo
b
~.7L
2.86 t
-2.85 T
-3.20,
6.36 T
-17.50 7.17 2.30 .01
a
-28.67 14.40 2.30 .001
a
22.42 10.49 2.26 .001
a
27.60 10.02 2.28 .001
Note : Cells with common subscripts, within each game, are not signi-
ficantly different from one another (ct = .05) using the Newman-
Keuls procedure.
Additional analyses, combining the data from the current study with
the data from the Roth and Malouf (1979) study, tested the differences
predicted by the strategic and sociological hypotheses. Both hypotheses
suggest that the data from the partial information condition in the Roth
and Malouf (19 79) study and the data from the low information condi-
tion in the current study will be equivalent and will not differ from
equal probability outcomes (i.e., D = 0) . Using games as a four level
19factor and the data from the two studies as a second factor in
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Table 5
Summary of Final Agreements
Game Game Game Game
Player Play er Player Player
Info Group 1 2 D 1 2 D 1 2 D 1 2 D
High 4 70 30 40 70 30 40 25 75 -50 40 60 -20
37 63 -26 33 67 -34
70 30 40 67 33 34 28.5 71. 5-43 25 75 -50
75 25 50 35 65 -30 51 49 2
5 50 50 50 50 50 50
55 45 10 50 50 50 50 50 50
50 50 75 25 50 40 60 -20
60 40 20 50 50 45 55 -10 25 75 -50
8 60 40 20 65 35 30 40 60 -20
70 30 40
80 20 60 100 100
9 60 40 20 50 50 40 60 -20 30 70 -40
60 40 20 60 40 20 50 50 35 65 -30
50 50 50 50
50 50 80 20 60 25 75 -50 23 77 -54
Inter- 3 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
mediate 49 51 -2 50 50 50 50 47 53 -6
50 50 45 50 -5 45 55 -10 30 65 -35
6 50 50 50 50 60 40 20 50 50
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
45 55 -10 50 50 40 60 -20
46 54 -8 50 50 45 55 -10
7 40 60 -20 52 48 4 50 50 50 50
50 50 42 58 -16 50 50
52 48 4 50 50
53 47 6 55 45 10 49 51 -2 43 57 -14
10 50 50 50 50 52 48 4 50 50
55 45 10 70 30 40
52 48 4 60 40 20 48 52 -4
40 60 -20 50 50 50 50
Low 1 50 50 51 49 2 50 50 51 49 2
55 45 10 49 51 -2 50 50 50 50
50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
50 50 51 49 2 49 51 -2
2 47.5 52. 5 -5 50 50 50 50 50 50
50 50 50 50 50 50 47.5 52. 5 -5
45 55 -10 50 50
50 50 50 50 50 50 55 45 10
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a between effects analysis of variance, the results showed no sig-
nificant differences between the two studies or among the four games.
The data (see Tables 2 and 4) show almost no departure from D = 0. Thus,
when players have no information about their opponent's payoffs, equal
probability outcomes predominated in both studies.
The strategic hypothesis predicts that the outcomes in the inter-
mediate information condition in the present study should be similar
to the outcomes observed in the full information condition in the Roth
and Malouf (1979) study. In other words, the movement away from an
equal probability outcome observed in the Roth and Malouf (1979) study
is predicted to be observed again in the intermediate information condi-
tions. The sociological hypothesis, on the other hand, predicts that
the Roth and Malouf (1979) data from the full information condition
will be similar to the data in the high information condition of this
experiment, and that the intermediate information condition of this
experiment should yield results that are not significantly different
from the partial information condition of the previous study. Prior
to statistical analysis, the data from the current study were trans-
formed to control for the differences between the games. In particular,
equal expected monetary value outcomes in games 2 and 4 were 80-20
;
equal expected value outcomes in games 1 and 3 and in the unequal pay-
off games of the previous study were 75-25. Thus, the data in games
2 and A were transformed; the analyses compared the proportions of
movement from equal probability splits toward equal unexpected value
splits in the two studies.
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The results are very clear. For only the agreements, a test in-
cluding the data from the unequal payoff games in the full information
condition of Roth and Malouf (1979) and the intermediate information
condition from the present study indicates strong differences in the
outcomes: F(l,68) = 23.56, p_ < .0001; the test comparing the same
Roth and Malouf (1979) data and the high information condition of this
experiment reveals almost no difference: F(l,63) < 1, ns. Consulting
Tables 2 and 4 clearly show the similarity of the data for the Roth and
Malouf full information condition and the data from the full information
condition in this study. In addition, the simple main effects analysis
of the current data also show the marked differences between the full
and intermediate information conditions. Thus, the sociological
hypothesis is strongly supported.
6. Discussion
The results of this experiment provide strong support for the
sociological hypothesis outlined in section 5, and clearly demonstrate
that the opportunity to strategically employ arguments concerning the
monetary prizes has a markedly different effect than the opportunity
to employ strategically equivalent arguments concerning the value of
the prizes as expressed in terms of the artificial commodity, chips.
Interestingly, this difference does not seem to be due to an unwilling-
ness of the bargainers to advance arguments in terms of chips; informal
analysis of the transcripts reveals striking similarities among the
messages in the intermediate and high information conditions and in the
full information condition of Roth and Malouf (1979).
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In each of these conditions, the apparently disadvantaged player
—
i.e., the player whose prize consisted of fewer chips in the intermediate
information condition, or the player whose prize had the smaller monetary
value in the full and high information conditions—frequently argued that
he should receive a larger probability of winning than his opponent, in
compensation for his smaller prize, and claimed that he would insist on
doing so. The frequent response of the apparently advantaged player was
that a fifty-fifty division of the lottery tickets looked reasonable to
hire, and that he would take nothing less. But as the results of the
experiment showed, this potential standoff was resolved differently in
the different conditions. In the intermediate information condition,
the player with the smaller number of chips tended to back off from his
demand for a higher probability and accept an equal probability of win-
ning, while in the high information condition, and in the full informa-
tion condition of Roth and Malouf (1979), the player with the higher
valued prize tended to back off from his demand for an equal probability
and accept a smaller probability of winning (c.f. Table 4).
In view of the fact that "disadvantaged" bargainers were so suc-
cessful in obtaining higher probabilities in the high information condi-
tion by employing arguments concerning money, and that they employed
strategically equivalent arguments concerning chips in the intermediate
information condition, it is all the more surprising that arguments
concerning chips had no statistically significant effect on the mean
observed agreements. Of course, in the intermediate information condi-
tion there was a very small tendency observed in each of the four games
for the player with fewer chips to get a higher probability of winning
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(cf. Figure 1). But, as the figure makes clear, even if this should
prove to be a reliable effect, it is orders of magnitude smaller than
the corresponding effect observed in the high information condition
which resulted in players with a smaller monetary prize receiving a
higher probability. Thus the difference between the outcomes observed
in the high information condition and those observed in the low infor-
mation condition cannot be accounted for by models constructed entirely
in terms of the feasible utility payoffs and strategy sets of the
players. Instead, the outcomes depend, to a significant degree, on
the sociological content of the shared information and the feasible
messages.
Further examination of the transcripts sheds some light on this
sociological content. In a high proportion of the bargaining encounters,
notions of equity and fairness were invoked by the bargainers in support
20
of their positions. These notions were invoked strategically, pre-
sumably to enhance the credibility of a bargainer's demand. Viewed in
this way, the results of the experiment suggest that the reason strate-
gically equivalent arguments did not have the same effect in different
information conditions is that different notions of equity need not be
equally credible. Specifically, the results suggest that equalizing
the probability that each player will win his prize is a more credible
notion of equity than equalizing each players' expected payoff in chips,
but not in money. Thus information about the monetary prizes affects
the bargaining in a way which it is not affected by information about
the prizes in terms of chips.
Of course, these remarks about equity involve some speculation
beyond the conclusions established in the last section by statistical
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analysis of the data. Our intention is merely to suggest an explanatory
model for the sociological phenomenon which the data demonstrates so
clearly. To formally investigate this particular explanation, it would
be necessary to directly investigate (among other things) the degree to
which information about a bargaining situation affects people's idea of
what constitutes an equitable settlement. As it happens, a study along
these lines (conducted independently of our work) reported in Yaari
and Bar-Hillel (1980), supports the hypothesis that equity notions are
highly sensitive to certain kinds of non-economic information.
The influence of sociological factors on the outcome of bargaining
can be observed in non-experimental settings as well. For instance,
when an American President issues voluntary wage guidelines as an anti-
inflation measure, he does so in order to influence the outcome of
industrial wage negotiations. Even though voluntary guidelines need
not change any of the economic factors underlying such negotiations,
they might influence the outcome by enhancing the credibility of, say,
a management proposal which conformed to the guidelines. Similarly,
wage settlements reached in one industry may affect the outcome of
negotiations in another, even when there is no direct economic influence
of wages in one industry on activity in the other.
In conclusion, we have shown that sociological factors—i.e., factors
unrelated to what we normally consider to be the "economic" parameters
21
of a game—can decisively influence the outcome of bargaining. This has
both encouraging and discouraging implications for the prospect of
developing theories of bargaining.
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On the discouraging side, these results suggest that it is unlikely
that a general theory of rational behavior in bargaining can be con-
structed on a purely deductive basis. While there certainly are situ-
ations in which strategic factors constrain the range of potential out-
comes sufficiently to permit useful conclusions to be drawn from first
principles, in many other situations (as in the bargaining games con-
sidered here) deduction based simply on the rationality of the players
leaves a wide range of potential outcomes (e.g., the contract curve in
a bargaining game is the entire set of individually rational, Pareto
optimal outcomes). Of course, the discouraging impact of these results
is tempered by the fact that, at least since the time of Edgeworth (1881),
attempts to develop deductive theories of bargaining based primarily
on the consequences of individual rationality have met with only limited
success.
So the encouraging side of these results is that they suggest an
approach which may lead to more successful bargaining theories. Specif-
ically, if certain kinds of sociological information can be incorporated
into a theory of bargaining, it may be possible to eliminate some of
the indeterminacy which cannot be resolved by theories which depend on
purely economic information. We hope to have more to say on this sub-
ject in future papers.
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Footnotes
Throughout this paper we will assume we are dealing with situa-
tions in which all agents exhibit sufficiently regular individual choice
behavior so that their revealed preferences can be modelled by numerical
utility functions over the set of possible outcomes. When uncertainty
is involved, these are assumed to be expected utility functions. The
significance of these assumptions for the empirical parts of the paper
will be discussed.
2
This conclusion may be (at least loosely) comparable to the dis-
covery by cognitive psychologists and researchers in artificial intelli-
gence (cf. Bransford and McCarrell (1975) or Minsky (1975)) that context
plays a crucial role in understanding natural language, and that the
meaning of a sentence depends on more than its linguistic structure. For
example, the sentence 'Please press this suit' obviously has a different
meaning when you are speaking to a tailor than when you are speaking to
a lawyer.) Similarly, we will demonstrate here that the outcome of a
game depends on more than its economic structure.
3
That is, the rules of the game are that any alternative a in the
set A will be the outcome of the game if both players agree on it,
otherwise a* will be the outcome. Thus the rules of the game give both
players a veto over any outcome other than a*.
4
Note that the assumption that a player's preferences are suffi-
ciently regular to be represented by an expected utility function is
equivalent, over this simple set of feasible outcomes, to the assumption
that the player prefers a higher probability of winning to a lower
probability of winning.
Note that we are considering the feasible set of utility payoffs
to be defined in terms of the utility function of each player for the
lottery which he receives, independently of the bargaining which has
taken place to achieve this lottery, and even independently of the lot-
tery which his opponent receives. In doing so, we are taking the point
of view that, while the progress of the negotiations may influence the
utilities of the bargainers for the agreement eventually reached, the
description of any effect which this has on the agreement reached be-
longs in the model of the bargaining process
, rather than in the model
of the bargaining situation
. Considerable confusion in the literature
has resulted from attempts to interpret bargaining models in terms of
the players' utilities for outcomes after the bargaining has ended,
since no bargaining model can be falsified by experimental evidence if,
after an outcome has been chosen, the utilities of the players can be
interpreted as having changed in whatever way is necessary to be con-
sistent with the model. In order to have predictive value, bargaining
theories must be stated in terms of parameters which can be measured
independently of the phenomena which the theories are designed to pre-
dict. (A discussion of the case when a player's preferences cannot be
interpreted as being independent of his opponent's lottery is found in
section 3 of Roth and Rothblum (1980)).
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Specifically, the prizes were common knowledge in this condition
(c.f. Roth and Murnighan (1980)).
Note that in both the full information and in the partial infor-
mation conditions, the resulting games meet the usual assumption that
the game is one of complete information: i.e. both players have suffi-
cient information to determine one another's expected utility for every
outcome. Of course in the full information condition, the players have
additional information, since they know one another's monetary payoffs
as well.
g
The detailed procedures by which these conditions were implemented
in practice will be discussed in section 5, since they are essentially
the same as those used in the experiment discussed there.
9
A more detailed statistical analysis can be found in Roth and
Malouf (1979), which also presents the unaggregated data from this ex-
periment .
The (unexpanded) strategic form of a game consists of the strat-
egy sets S.. and S_ and payoff functions II. and II_ such that, for any
strategy pair s = (s.. ,s_) , n.(s) = u.(0(s)) for i = 1,2. That is, the
(unexpanded) strategic form of a game represents the actual outcomes of
the game only in terms of the utilities of the players. Since we will
be interested in distinguishing the strategy choices of the players from
the set of resulting outcomes (over which the players' utility functions
are defined), we will use the expanded strategic form of the game
,
rather than collapsing the functions u. and into the single "payoff
function" II.. Although our concern here is with binary lottery games,
we phrase the discussion in terms of this general model in order to make
clear how the issues discussed here apply to arbitrary games.
The notion of strategic equivalence takes a somewhat different
form when applied to other kinds of game models.
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A pair of strategy choices s = (s.. ,s„) in a game G is a Nash
(1951) equilibrium if s is player l's best response against player 2's
choice of s„, and s_ is player 2's best response to player l's choice
of s (i.e. if u (0(s)) >_ u
]
(0(t
1
,s„)) for all t.. in S-, and if
u„(0(s))
_> u„(0(s. ,t_)) for all t„ in S_). If s is an equilibrium pair
of strategies, the resulting outcome 0(s) is an equilibrium outcome, and
(u. (0(s)) ,u_(0(s))) is an equilibrium payoff.
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13
That is, such a theory might not select the "same" equilibrium
in two strategically equivalent games if it depends on information about
the strategy sets which isn't preserved by strategic equivalence.
14
These strategy sets are infinite, involving as they do the
choice not only of the content of individual messages, but also their
timing. If we wished to be able to compute equilibria of a bargaining
game in strategic form, we would need to confine our attention to games
in which the strategy sets are much more restricted. Some interesting
results obtained using this alternative approach are contained in recent
papers by Rubinstein (1980) and Binmore (1980).
For the sake of brevity, binary lottery games will sometimes be
referred to as chip games or money games
,
depending on whether the
prizes are expressed in chips as well as money, or in money alone.
Informal analysis of the transcripts from the bargaining ob-
served in previous experiments lends support to this hypothesis.
In each information condition, a bargainer saw displayed the ex-
pected value in money and chips which he_ would receive from any proposal
he made or received. In the high information condition, he also saw the
same computations concerning his opponent. In the intermediate informa-
tion condition, expected monetary value computations were not displayed
for his opponent, and in the low information condition, neither was
information concerning the number of chips in his opponent's prize.
That is, in each condition, only computations which could be made with
the available information were displayed.
18
The data treated each of the games played by each of the sub-
jects as a between rather than within factor. Although every player
played each of the four games, they always faced a different opponent.
Treatment of the data in this fashion makes statistical tests more
conservative.
19
The four games in the two studies are not comparable ; this
factor was included only to increase the ability to diagnose the cause
of any significant effects that might have resulted.
20
Thus, for example, in the intermediate information condition,
a player who suggested that the fairest agreement is to equalize each
player's expected number of chips was invariably a player who had a
smaller prize in chips than his opponent.
21
Schelling (1960) , who reached a similar conclusion on intuitive
grounds, suggested that experimental methods would be needed to further
pursue such matters. We obviously agree. That is, since the sociological
contest in which bargaining is conducted plays such an important role in
determining the outcome, any theory of bargaining—whether descriptive
or prescriptive—must necessarily include empirical content, rather than
being purely deductive in nature.
M/C/239
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